Bill Boersma: What’s It Going to Take? Fixing the Life Insurance Policies Nobody Monitored

“For nearly fifty years, permanent life insurance has been sold on projected assumptions rather than guarantees, and for nearly thirty of those years the professional literature has described exactly what would happen when those projections failed. Universal life illustrated at 11 to 14% gave way to variable universal life illustrated at 12%, which has given way to indexed universal life illustrated at rates many observers believe cannot be sustained. The warnings were published, the trustee duties were identified, and the policies kept failing anyway. But the advisor reading this did not sell the policy. The advisor reading this inherited it. This article is about what to do with it: how to triage a book of coverage, what to demand from the carrier, how to read what comes back, what the remediation options actually cost in tax, and what a trustee has to put in the file to survive the review.”

Bill Boersma provides commentary on the structural failure of illustration-based life insurance and sets out a working protocol for advisors and trustees who have to evaluate, repair or unwind policies that were never designed conservatively and have never been reviewed.

Bill Boersma is a CLU, AEP and LIC and the founder and owner of OC Consulting Group. More information can be found at www.OC-LIC.com, www.BillBoersmaOnLifeInsurance.info or email at bill@oc-lic.com or call at 616-456-1000.[i]

Here is his commentary:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

A substantial body of professional literature published between 1997 and 2004 identified and described the central structural problem in modern permanent life insurance: a policy illustrated on projected assumptions rather than guarantees will not perform as illustrated when those assumptions change. Academic journals, actuarial publications, the trade press and the mainstream financial media all covered it. The recommendations were consistent and unremarkable. Design conservatively. Monitor annually. Treat the contract as an actively managed asset. Recognize that a trustee carries an affirmative duty to review trust-owned coverage.

Nearly three decades later the same failures continue to surface, now in the current generation of indexed universal life. The illustrated rates have changed and the products have changed, but the underlying dynamic has not.

The practical consequence is that a large population of policies written between roughly 1985 and 2005 is now reaching the point of failure, and the professionals holding the problem are rarely the professionals who created it. This article does two things. It explains how the industry arrived here, briefly, because the history bears on the diligence. It then sets out the working mechanics: a triage screen for identifying which policies in a book need attention first, the specific in-force ledgers to demand from a carrier and how to read them, a worked example showing what a failed 1987 universal life contract actually costs to repair, a remediation menu with the tax consequences attached to each option, and the documentation a trustee needs in the annual review file.

Three decisions frame the fiduciary standard. In In re Stuart Cochran Irrevocable Trust, a documented process using an independent evaluator protected a corporate trustee whose decision looked disastrous in hindsight. In French v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., express instrument language displaced the prudent investor rule and the self-dealing prohibition. In Rafert v. Meyer, exculpatory language drafted by the trustee himself did not survive the duty to keep beneficiaries informed. Read together, they say something advisors can act on: the outcome does not determine liability, but the process does.

COMMENT:

Thirty Years of Warnings

There were multiple articles published in the late nineties and early 2000s discussing issues with life insurance performance. They all tell essentially the same story: policies failing because crediting rates fell as interest rates declined. Additional professional journals published pieces, and non-professional publications including Forbes, The Wall Street Journal, Money Magazine, BusinessWeek, USA Today and The New York Times chimed in over the years. A handful of the professional pieces appears below.

YearArticlePublicationWhy It’s Important
1997Incorporating Historical Investment Performance in Projecting Life Insurance Cash ValuesFinancial Services ReviewOne of the earliest academic papers criticizing illustrations based solely on current crediting rates and advocating historical analysis. It specifically discusses consumer dissatisfaction and litigation after interest rates declined.
1999Trust Owned Life Insurance: Is It an Accident Waiting to Happen?National Underwriter Life & HealthWarned trustees that UL policies required ongoing monitoring and could fail if assumptions changed.
1999Managing Trust-Owned Life Insurance RevisitedTrusts & EstatesExplained that TOLI management had become an ongoing fiduciary responsibility because changing interest rates materially affected policy performance.
1999Next Generation Universal LifeSociety of Actuaries RecordDiscussed the dramatic decline in UL crediting rates, from approximately 11 to 12% in the mid-1980s to about 6% by 1999, and why older UL products were under pressure.
2000The Nature and Causes of Variation in Insurance Policy YieldsJournal of Insurance IssuesExamined actual policy yields from 1988 to 1998 and demonstrated the wide variation in UL performance versus expectations.
2002Defuse This Time BombTrusts & EstatesJoel Koenig’s article arguing that thousands of older UL policies had become “time bombs” because declining crediting rates required additional premiums.
2004Various TOLI monitoring articlesTrusts & Estates, Estate PlanningFocus shifted from simply identifying the problem to establishing fiduciary procedures for annual policy reviews.

Nearly every article from that era emphasized the same points. Policies illustrated at 10 to 12% crediting rates were unlikely to sustain themselves if renewal rates fell to 6 or 7% and eventually 4%. Vanishing premiums frequently did not vanish. Trustees had an affirmative duty to review trust-owned policies. Universal life and whole life had to be treated as an actively managed asset rather than a buy-it-and-forget-it product. Additional premiums would often be required decades after issue to preserve the death benefit. And failure to monitor created litigation exposure for trustees and advisors.

This isn’t rocket science, but it might as well be given how few policy owners, professional advisors and even some insurance agents fully understand it.

What Happened

Prior to the late 1970s, most permanent life insurance was built on fixed assumptions. With a rate book and a calculator you could determine the premium, cash value and death benefit at any point. Once projected assumptions replaced guarantees, the responsibility for policy performance fundamentally changed, and it changed in a direction almost no buyer understood.

When interest rates soared in the late 1970s and early 1980s, carriers began illustrating policies using those unusually high rates as though they would continue indefinitely. The rates were real at the time, but everyone knew they wouldn’t last forever. Policies were sold anyway on projections that assumed they would. This wasn’t limited to a few aggressive companies; the industry’s most respected carriers participated. The illustrations may have complied with the rules of the day, but many created expectations that were unrealistic over the long term.

The pattern repeated in the late 1990s. Variable universal life was illustrated during one of the greatest bull markets in history using assumed returns of up to 12% year in and year out. In hindsight those assumptions seem extraordinary, yet they were no more optimistic than mid-1980s illustrations projecting similar returns from bond portfolios. There were universal life policies put in force on permanent 14% crediting assumptions.

Lesson Still Not Learned

Today, many indexed universal life policies continue to be illustrated using crediting assumptions that many observers believe are difficult to sustain over the life of the contract. Marketing often suggests policy owners can participate in stock market gains without market losses. The downside protection is real (from a crediting standpoint, not actual cash value, but the upside is limited by caps, participation rates, spreads and the exclusion of dividends, and over long periods those limitations can substantially reduce returns compared to the underlying equity market. I have reviewed illustrations showing projected crediting rates of 7% to 8% tied to indexes that have produced disappointing long-term results, some failing to outpace inflation over extended periods, while the illustration projected optimistic outcomes decades into the future.

There is a further point specific to indexed products that rarely gets made to clients. The carrier generally retains the contractual right to change caps, participation rates and spreads after issue. The illustrated rate is therefore not merely an assumption about the index; it is an assumption about the index and an assumption that the carrier will not exercise a right it expressly reserved. Any diligence on an in-force indexed policy has to include the actual history of cap and participation rate changes since issue, not just the current figures.

Why It Keeps Happening

Life insurance agents frequently describe themselves as advisors, consultants, specialists or financial professionals, and many are exactly that: ethical, knowledgeable and deeply committed to their clients. But consumers continue placing enormous trust in illustrations they do not fully understand and signing paperwork they have not reviewed, and too many discover years later that the assumptions underpinning their policies never materialized. Meanwhile, many agents continue operating under suitability standards considerably less demanding than the obligations imposed on FINRA-registered representatives or SEC-registered investment advisers. Those differences matter when consumers believe they are receiving comprehensive financial advice.

That is the diagnosis, and it has been the diagnosis for thirty years. Restating it accomplishes nothing for the attorney, accountant or trustee who is holding a policy today and has to decide what to do about it. The rest of this article is addressed to them.

WHAT ADVISORS AND TRUSTEES CAN ACTUALLY DO:

Step One: Triage

Not every policy needs a full review this quarter, but some need one immediately. The following characteristics, in rough order of urgency, identify the contracts most likely to be in trouble:

·      Universal life issued before 2010, particularly where the original illustration showed premiums ceasing after a stated number of years. 

·      Any policy sold on a vanishing premium or premium offset basis where premiums did in fact stop.

·      Variable universal life issued between roughly 1995 and 2001.

·      Any contract where cash value is lower this year than last year. 

·      Any policy with an outstanding loan, especially where loan interest is being capitalized rather than paid.

·      Trust-owned coverage that has not been formally reviewed within the last three years, or where the trustee cannot produce a review file.

·      Insureds past age 75, where cost of insurance charges accelerate sharply and the window to correct is closing.

·      Indexed universal life where the caps or participation rates in effect today differ materially from those illustrated at issue.

A policy hitting any one of these should be reviewed soon and a policy hitting three or more of these should be pulled for a full in-force review before anything else on the list. These are the high impact targets but remember that any policy from any era could be facing issues depending on a variety of issues. Even a policy issued today could project failure if independently modeled on more realistic assumptions. 

Step Two: Request the Right Ledgers

Most reviews fail at this stage. The owner or trustee requests “an in-force illustration,” the carrier sends a single ledger run at current assumptions, and everyone concludes the policy is fine because the ledger shows it in force to age 100. That ledger is the least informative document the carrier can produce. The request should be specific and should ask for all of the following in writing:

·      An in-force ledger at current assumptions, continuing the premium currently being paid.

·      An in-force ledger at guaranteed maximum charges and the guaranteed minimum crediting rate. This is the only column in the entire package that the carrier is contractually obligated to honor, and it is where the real risk is visible. (Generally, this is required to be provided with any in-force ledger, but it’s not always a focus of attention.) 

·      In-force ledgers at the current crediting rate reduced by one percentage point and by two percentage points, holding charges at current levels.

·      A ledger solving for the premium required to carry the policy to age 100, and separately to contract maturity, at current assumptions and again at guaranteed assumptions.

·      A ledger solving for the death benefit the existing cash value and a stated premium will sustain to maturity, which is the reduce-and-hold option.

·      The policy detail or annual statement history showing actual cost of insurance charges, expense charges and interest credited by year since issue.

·      For indexed contracts, the history of cap, participation rate and spread changes since issue, and the actual credited rate for each segment.

·      Confirmation of any outstanding loan balance, the loan interest rate, the crediting rate applied to loaned values, and whether interest is being paid or capitalized.

When the ledgers arrive, read the guaranteed column first and read it from the bottom. The year the guaranteed column goes to zero is the date the policy fails if the carrier exercises every right it has reserved. Then compare the current-assumption ledger to the original illustration at the same duration. The gap between the two is the cumulative cost of the assumptions that did not materialize, and it is usually the number that finally gets the client’s attention.

Step Three: Understand What the Repair Costs

The following is a composite drawn from fact patterns I see repeatedly rather than any single client file, but the arithmetic is representative.

 As Illustrated in 1987As It Actually Stands
InsuredMale, age 45Male, age 84
Death benefit$2,000,000$2,000,000
Illustrated crediting rate11.5%, assumed levelCredited at the 4% contractual floor since 2015
Planned premium$14,800 per year, “vanishing” after year 8No premium paid since 1995, as the illustration directed
Cash valueProjected to grow through age 95Approximately $61,000 and declining each month
Current cost of insuranceNot separately presented to the buyerRoughly $9,000 per month against a net amount at risk of $1.94 million
Projected statusIn force to maturity with no further outlayGrace notice expected within 14 months
Cost to carry to age 100Zero, per the illustrationApproximately $186,000 in year one, rising annually
Cost to reduce and holdNot contemplatedFace reduced to $650,000, carried to age 100 for about $38,000 per year

Two observations matter more than the specific figures. First, the client in this example did nothing wrong. He paid every premium the illustration asked for, for as long as the illustration asked for it. Second, the cost of the repair is not the annual premium; it is the difference between what the coverage now costs and what the client was told it would cost, compounded over the years nobody looked. Had this policy been reviewed in 2005, the corrective premium would have been a fraction of the current figure. The single most expensive feature of these cases is delay.

It is the same as if you realized at age 45 you were off the retirement targets you established when you were 30. The adjustment would have been easily manageable if discovered at, say, age 35. They will be painful at age 45. They may be unmanageable at age 55. It may sound ridiculous to talk about discovering the shortfall on the eve of retirement at age 65, but that’s more akin to what happens in the life insurance world. 

Sure, this is an example of a universal life policy with current crediting roughly a third of the projected crediting at the point of sale, but a policy currently crediting 5.75% that was originally projected at 6.0% is also off target, right? 

Though traditional whole life is a different animal in some respects, today’s credited dividend rates are roughly half of what they were in the mid-1980s. Some of them are merely disappointments and some are disasters waiting to happen. 

Step Four: Choose a Remedy, and Price the Tax

Once the ledgers are in hand, the menu of options is finite. What varies is the cost and the tax treatment, and that is where advisors add the most value and where uninformed decisions do the most damage.

OptionEffectPrincipal Tax ConsiderationsBest Fit
Increase premiumKeeps the full death benefit in force at a higher annual outlay.Additional premiums into an ILIT are new gifts requiring Crummey notices and, in generation-skipping trusts, GST exemption allocation. Confirm the policy does not become a modified endowment contract under §7702A.Death benefit is still needed and the client can fund it.
Reduce the death benefitRight-sizes the coverage to the money already in the contract.A benefit reduction can trigger seven-pay retesting under §7702A and a guideline premium recalculation under §7702 that forces a cash distribution taxable under §72(e).Liquidity need has shrunk since issue.
§1035 exchangeMoves cash value into a guaranteed or no-lapse chassis.Nonrecognition under §1035 with carryover basis. An outstanding loan carried over or discharged is boot, taxable to the extent of gain. The new contract is tested fresh under §7702A and any pre-June 21, 1988 grandfathering is lost. New contestability and suicide periods begin.Guarantee may be worth more than upside.
Reduced paid-upConverts to a smaller fully paid contract with no further premium.Generally not a taxable event, but confirm modified endowment status on the reduced contract.Whole life where premiums must stop.
Life settlementSells the policy for more than surrender value.Gain up to what a surrender would produce is ordinary income; the excess is capital gain. The 2017 Act eliminated the reduction of basis for cost of insurance. Reporting applies under §6050Y, and the sale is generally a reportable policy sale that strips the buyer’s transfer-for-value exceptions under §101(a)(3).Coverage is no longer wanted and the insured’s health has declined.
SurrenderEnds the contract and returns cash surrender value.Gain over investment in the contract is ordinary income under §72(e). Any outstanding loan counts as an amount received.No continuing need and no settlement market.
Do nothingThe policy lapses.The worst outcome available. If a loan is outstanding, lapse is treated as a distribution and produces ordinary income on money the client never receives.Almost never defensible once the problem is known.

The Trap Worth Repeating

A policy with a substantial outstanding loan that lapses produces taxable income on money the client never receives. The loan is treated as an amount received, gain is measured against the investment in the contract, and the client gets a Form 1099-R for a policy that paid nothing to anyone. It is entirely possible for a client to lose the death benefit and receive a five-, six-, or seven-figure tax bill in the same calendar year. When a loaned policy is heading toward lapse, that fact alone usually justifies an immediate remediation decision, and frequently justifies a settlement or a structured surrender in a controlled year rather than an uncontrolled lapse in whatever year the grace period happens to expire.

Related and equally overlooked: moving a policy between trusts, from a trust to the insured, or into or out of an entity can implicate the transfer-for-value rule, which converts an income-tax-free death benefit into a largely taxable one. The statutory exceptions are narrow, and the 2017 reportable policy sale rules narrowed the analysis further. No policy should change hands as part of a cleanup without that question being asked and answered in writing.

Note that though the surrender of a policy where the cash value is less than the policy basis will not result in taxable gain, the policy owner also cannot take a deduction. However, that may not be the end of the line for a savvy advisor. 

The Trustee’s File

Three decisions frame what a trustee of an irrevocable life insurance trust is actually expected to do. In In re Stuart Cochran Irrevocable Trust, 901 N.E.2d 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), a corporate trustee retained an independent insurance consultant, evaluated variable policies that were projected to lapse, and exchanged them for a guaranteed contract with a lower death benefit. The insured died within a year and the beneficiaries received far less than the original policies would have paid. The court held for the trustee, reasoning that prudence is measured by the facts existing when the decision was made and not by hindsight, and treating the trustee’s reliance on an independent evaluator with no stake in the outcome as a significant factor.

In French v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 722 F.3d 1079 (7th Cir. 2013), a bank trustee replaced trust-owned whole life policies with new coverage providing the same benefit at a lower premium, and its own insurance brokerage affiliate earned the commission. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment for the bank, holding that express instrument language waiving conflicts of interest and granting broad investment discretion displaced both the common-law self-dealing prohibition and the prudent investor rule, subject always to a duty of good faith. The lesson for drafters is that the instrument matters enormously, in both directions.

In Rafert v. Meyer, 290 Neb. 219, 859 N.W.2d 332 (2015), the drafting attorney named himself trustee, wrote in language relieving himself of any duty to pay premiums or notify beneficiaries of nonpayment, and gave the carriers an address at which he never received mail. Policies totaling $8.5 million lapsed and nobody learned of it for two years. The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed dismissal, holding that an exculpatory term drafted by the trustee is invalid unless the trustee proves it was fair and adequately communicated to the settlor, and that trust language cannot eliminate the duty to keep beneficiaries reasonably informed.

Read together, these cases point in one direction. Liability does not turn on whether the policy performed. It turns on whether there was a process, whether the process drew on information from someone without a stake in the outcome, whether the beneficiaries were told what they needed to know, and whether any of it was written down. A trustee who reviews a policy annually, documents the analysis, and decides to do nothing is in a far better position than a trustee who happens to hold a policy that has not yet failed.

At a minimum, the annual review file should contain the ledger package described above, a written statement of the analysis and the conclusion, evidence of the carrier’s current financial strength ratings, documentation of any consultant engaged and the basis for selecting them, a record of what was communicated to the beneficiaries and when, and a calendared date for the next review. Where the trustee lacks the expertise to evaluate the coverage, delegation to a qualified agent is permitted under the prudent investor framework, but delegation requires care in selecting the agent, defining the scope, and reviewing performance. Delegating and forgetting is not delegation.

Who Owns the Monitoring

The most common failure in this area is not a bad decision but an unassigned responsibility. The attorney assumes the agent is watching the policy. The agent assumes the trustee is watching. The trustee, frequently a family member who accepted the role as a favor, assumes the professionals are watching. The accountant sees a Crummey notice once a year and reasonably concludes someone else is handling it. Nobody is watching, and the file is silent on the point.

This is fixable with one paragraph. Engagement letters and trustee acceptance documents should state affirmatively whether policy monitoring is within scope, and if it is not, should say who is expected to perform it. Language along the lines of the following is adequate: our engagement does not include monitoring the performance of any life insurance policy held by the trust, and we recommend the trustee engage a qualified independent professional to conduct an annual in-force review and provide the results to the trustee and to us. That sentence costs nothing to include and resolves the question that otherwise gets litigated years later.

CONCLUSION:

Every so often I hit a stretch where several troubled cases land on my desk at once. They are not abstract. They are estate plans that no longer work, business succession arrangements that fall apart, charitable gifts that will never be funded, and surviving spouses forced into decisions nobody prepared them for. I have seen families lose hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars, some bankrupted by failing policies, and I have seen life insurance become a financial liability rather than the protection it was purchased to provide.

What separates those cases from the ones that get fixed is almost never the product and almost never the carrier. It is whether somebody looked, and when. A policy reviewed at year fifteen is usually a manageable problem. The same policy reviewed at year thirty-five is often unsalvageable at any price the client will pay. In fact, it is all too common that the policy is so underfunded that the insurance carrier literally cannot run projections showing how much it takes to get it to survive. The industry’s failure to design conservatively is real and has been documented for thirty years, but it is not the part of this problem that advisors control. The review is.

After watching this story repeat itself decade after decade, the question still stands. But it is worth restating in a more useful form. Not what’s it going to take for the industry to change, because that answer has not arrived in fifty years and may not arrive at all. The better question is what it takes to pull one file, order one complete ledger package, and put one page of analysis behind it. That much is available to every advisor reading this, today, and it is the difference between a policy that fails and one that gets caught.

HOPE THIS HELPS YOU HELP OTHERS MAKE A POSITIVEDIFFERENCE!

Bill Boersma

CITE AS:

LISI Financial Products Planning Newsletter #60 (October 16, 2026) at http://www.leimbergservices.com. Copyright © 2026 Leimberg Information Services, Inc. (LISI) Reproduction in Any Form or Forwarding to Any Person Prohibited – Without Express Permission. Our agreement with you does not allow you to use or upload content from LISI into any hardware, software, bot, or external application, including any use(s) for artificial intelligence technologies such as large language models, generative AI, machine learning or AI system. This newsletter is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information regarding the subject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that LISI is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional advice or services. If such advice is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought. Statements of fact or opinion are the responsibility of the authors and do not represent an opinion on the part of the officers or staff of LISI.

CITES:

In re Stuart Cochran Irrevocable Trust, 901 N.E.2d 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); French v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 722 F.3d 1079 (7th Cir. 2013); Rafert v. Meyer, 290 Neb. 219, 859 N.W.2d 332 (2015); IRC §§72(e), 101(a)(2), 101(a)(3), 1035, 6050Y, 7702, 7702A; Uniform Prudent Investor Act §§ 2, 9; Uniform Trust Code §§ 813, 1008; NAIC Life Insurance Illustrations Model Regulation (#582); NAIC Actuarial Guideline 49 and successors governing indexed universal life illustrated rates.

CITATIONS:

[i] The opinions expressed in this newsletter are those of the author and should not be construed as specific investment advice. Nothing herein constitutes tax or legal advice, and readers should consult their own advisors regarding the application of any provision discussed to a particular contract or client. Securities offered through Valmark Securities, Inc. Member FINRA, SIPC. Investment Advisory Services offered through Valmark Advisers, Inc. a SEC Registered Investment Advisor. OC Consulting Group and its affiliates are separate entities from Valmark Securities, Inc. and Valmark Advisers, Inc.

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